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Abstract
We propose a semantic representation of the standard quantum logic
QL within a classical, normal modal logic, and this via a lattice-embedding
of orthomodular lattices into Boolean algebras with one modal operator.
Thus our classical logic is a completion of the quantum logic QL. In other
words, we refute Birkhoff and von Neumann’s classic thesis that the logic
(the formal character) of Quantum Mechanics would be non-classical as
well as Putnam’s thesis that quantum logic (of his kind) would be the cor-
rect logic for propositional inference in general. The propositional logic
of Quantum Mechanics is modal but classical, and the correct logic for
propositional inference need not have an extroverted quantum character.
One normal necessity modality  suffices to capture the subjectivity of
observation in quantum experiments, and this thanks to its failure to dis-
tribute over classical disjunction. The key to our result is the translation
of quantum negation as classical negation of observability.
Keywords: Boolean Algebras with Operators (BAOs); algebraic, normal
modal logic; lattice representation theory; ordered algebraic structures;
orthomodular lattices; quantum logic; quantum structures.
1 Introduction
The idea for this paper originates in an observation that I made in the plenum of
a talk delivered by Newton da Costa at the 4th World Congress and School on
Universal Logic in Rio de Janeiro in 2013. The observation is about a presenta-
tion of a quantum experiment that has been put forward as a counter-example to
the suitability of classical logic for reasoning about quantum phenomena and as
a motivation for alternative logics such as quantum logics, over and over again.
The presentation usually involves three statements, say P , Q, and R, each one
being about an elementary quantum phenomenon produced by the experiment,
∗I dedicate this paper to my professor Jacques Zahnd.
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but such that
P is observed to be true︸ ︷︷ ︸
P is true
and (Q or R) is observed to be true︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Q ∨ R) is true︸ ︷︷ ︸
P ∧(Q ∨ R) is true
. (1)
Notice that the observation of the truth of a disjunction does not imply the
observation of the truth of one of its disjuncts. That is, (Q∨R)→ (Q∨R)
is not a valid principle. This is an essential uncertainty.1 (On the other hand,
the converse (Q ∨R)→ (Q ∨R) is a valid principle.) Hence, and in fact,
neither (P and Q) nor (P and R) is observed to be true.︸ ︷︷ ︸
¬(P ∧Q) ∧ ¬(P ∧ R) is true (or: ¬((P ∧Q) ∨(P ∧ R)) is true)
(2)
The quantum-mechanical details need not concern us here. However, what does
need concern us here is that the presentation of the experiment concludes that
(P and (Q or R)) is true but not ((P and Q) or (P and R)).
That is,
“(P and (Q or R))” and “((P and Q) or (P and R))” are not equivalent. (3)
Apparently, the distributivity of classical conjunction and disjunction fails!
Whence arises the motivation for special quantum conjunction and disjunction.
Now, my observation is that the experiment—though classic—is not well
presented, that is, the formalisation of the experimental observations is unfor-
tunate. The point is that the fact of observing the fact P and the fact (Q or R)
should be made explicit in the formalisation too, for example as P ∧(Q∨R).
Hence in the experiment, P ∧(Q∨R) is true (1) but not (P ∧Q)∨(P ∧R)
(2). That is, (P ∧(Q∨R))→ ((P ∧Q)∨(P ∧R)) is false. On the other
hand, the converse ((P ∧Q)∨(P ∧R))→ (P ∧(Q∨R)) is true, because:
((P ∧Q) ∨(P ∧R))→ ((P ∧Q) ∨ (P ∧R)) is true
↔ (P ∧ (Q ∨R)) is true
↔ (P ∧(Q ∨R)) is true
(As noticed above,  distributes over ∧ in both directions, but over ∨ only in
one direction.) Thus, and in close correspondence with (3),
(P ∧(Q ∨R))↔ ((P ∧Q) ∨(P ∧R)) is false. (4)
Hence, if we make explicit the fact of observing facts (for example by
means of a modal operator ) then we do not need to introduce the special-
purpose formalism of Quantum Logic with special and possibly counter-intuitive
1This is also an important difference to Intuitionistic Logic (and others), where the validity
of a disjunction does imply the validity of at least one disjunct (cf. Disjunction Property).
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quantum operators to account for quantum phenomena (due to the apparent
failure of classical conjunction to distribute over classical disjunction), but can
get by with intuitive classical (Boolean) logic at the small price of adding a sin-
gle, classical modal operator  . This operator is characterised by the following
two axioms K (normality) and BQ plus the single deduction rule N (normality):
1. (A→ B)→ (A→ B) (Kripke’s law, K)
2. ♦A↔ A, where ♦ := ¬¬ (BQ)
3. from A infer A (necessitation rule, N)
BQ has the encouraging meaning that quantum truth is equivalent to
• observing the possibility of that truth, or, equivalently,
• the possibility of observing that truth.
(Consider that ♦A ↔ A is true if and only if ¬♦A ↔ ¬A is true if and
only if ♦¬♦A ↔ ¬A is true if and only if ♦¬A ↔ ¬A is true if and only if
♦A↔ A is true.) The laws of Boolean logic plus the three modal laws K, BQ,
and N, which are embodied in our classical modal logic BQ, suffice to model
the logical essence of Quantum Mechanics as captured by the standard quantum
logic QL [10, Page 32]. To appreciate the smallness of the price of understanding
BQ, consider the price of understanding QL. This standard quantum logic is
characterised by the following 12 axioms plus one deduction rule [10, Page 32]:
1. (A ≡ B)→0 ((B ≡ C)→0 (A ≡ C))
2. (A ≡ B)→0 (∼A ≡ ∼B)
3. (A ≡ B)→0 ((Auprise C) ≡ (B uprise C))
4. (AupriseB) ≡ (B upriseA)
5. (Auprise (B uprise C)) ≡ ((AupriseB)uprise C)
6. (Auprise (AgB)) ≡ A
7. (∼AupriseA) ≡ ((∼AupriseA)upriseB)
8. A ≡ ∼∼A
9. ∼(AgB) ≡ (∼Auprise∼B) (De-Morgan law)
10. (A ≡ B) ≡ (B ≡ A)
11. (A ≡ B)→0 (A→0 B)
12. (A→0 B)→3 (A→3 (A→3 B))
13. from A and A→3 B infer B
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with the three abbreviations:
A→0 B := ∼AgB
A→3 B := (∼AupriseB)g (∼Auprise∼B)g (Auprise (∼AgB))
A ≡ B := (AupriseB)g (∼Auprise∼B)
and uprise, g, and ∼ symbolising quantum conjunction, quantum disjunction, and
quantum negation, respectively (my choice, to distinguish the quantum opera-
tors clearly from their classical counterparts). Observe that this axiom system
for QL employs two notions of implication, symbolised as →0 and →3, as well
as one notion of equivalence, symbolised as ≡ , but that is defined in terms
of neither notion of implication! Proving the adequacy of this axiom system
for the standard quantum structures of orthomodular lattices must have been
a real tour de force, which must be appreciated as such. Fortunately, we do
not need to understand nor use this axiom system in order to understand the
logical essence of Quantum Mechanics. All we need to understand is that QL
and its corresponding, standard quantum-structure semantics of orthomodular
lattices satisfy the De-Morgan law, and thus quantum disjunction is definable
in terms of quantum negation and quantum conjunction. Hence in essence, the
culprit for the failure of quantum conjunction to distribute over quantum dis-
junction boils down to quantum negation! We thus must find a translation of
quantum negation in terms of the modal operator  and Boolean operators.
The translation that we have found and shall now present and explicate is to
translate quantum negation ∼ as ¬ .
That is, we translate quantum negation as classical negation of observability.
Recall from classical normal modal logic that ¬ (“not necessarily”) is the
same as ♦¬ (“possibly not”). Hence, the classical negation of observability is
classically equivalent to the possibility of observing classical negation. Thus, we
can also view quantum negation as the possibility of observing classical negation.
2 The technical details of the translation
We shall carry out our translation from QL into BQ semantically, by producing
a lattice-embedding from the standard orthomodular-lattice (OML-)model of QL
into the standard Boolean-algebra-with-one-operator (BAO-)model of BQ [19].
So, not only logicians but also mathematicians will be able to appreciate our
result. For simplicity, we will reuse some of the symbols for the (syntactic) oper-
ators of QL from the introduction for their corresponding (semantic) operators
of the OML-model of QL, and only use different symbols for the (syntactic) op-
erators of BQ and their corresponding (semantic) operators of our BAO. Both
algebraic models involve a set of subsets of a set of states as carrier together
with algebraic operations on this carrier set. So, let S designate our state space,
that is, the set of all possible worlds, points, or states, H(S) the set of subsets
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of S that is algebraically closed under the OML-operations for the carrier of the
OML-model, and P(S) the powerset of S for the carrier of our BAO-model.
Then, translate the orthomodular (and thus De Morgan) lattice [10]
OML := 〈H(S), 0,uprise,g, 1, ·⊥,4 〉
on S to a corresponding (inclusion-ordered, complete) Boolean (powerset) al-
gebra (lattice)
BAO := 〈P(S), ∅,∩,∪,S, · , 〈R〉,⊆〉
with one operator 〈R〉 : 2S → 2S
〈R〉(S) := { s ∈ S | there is s′ ∈ S such that s R s′ and s′ ∈ S }
for an—only for now—arbitrary (see the end of this section) accessibility rela-
tion2 R ⊆ S × S [19], that is, a binary relation on S of no particularity, and
with dual operator [R] : 2S → 2S [18, Definition 3.8.2]
[R](S) := { s ∈ S | for all s′ ∈ S, if s R s′ then s′ ∈ S }
by means of an injective mapping ρ : OML BAO such that
ρ(H⊥) = ∼ρ(H) (∼-homomorphism)
ρ(H upriseH ′) = ρ(H) ∩ ρ(H ′) (meet homomorphism)
where ∼ := 〈R〉 ◦ · . As usual, ◦ designates function composition. Note that
ρ is induced (and thus exists) by its syntactic counterpart mentioned in the
introduction (translate ∼ as ¬, or, equivalently, as ♦¬), and this via the
standard Lindenbaum-Tarski-algebra construction [8] on the language of QL
and on the language of BQ. (See also Corollary 1 for this translation.)
The operator [R] is the semantic analog of the modality , and is related to
R as asserted by the following fact.
Fact 1 ([18, Exercise 3.65]).
s R s′ if and only if for all S ⊆ S, s ∈ [R](S) implies s′ ∈ S
As opposed to the operator [R], its dual 〈R〉 does distribute over set union ∪,
as asserted by the following well-known, but to our development crucial fact.
Fact 2 (Property of 〈R〉).
〈R〉(S ∪ S′) = 〈R〉(S) ∪ 〈R〉(S′)
Now, recall the following laws of orthomodular lattices:
• De Morgan:
H gH ′ = (H⊥ upriseH ′⊥)
⊥
2Accessibility relations are at the heart of Kripke-semantics for modal logics [3].
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• orthocomplementarity:
– involution: H⊥⊥ = H
– disjointness: H upriseH⊥ = 0
– exhaustiveness: H gH⊥ = 1
– antitonicity: H 4 H ′ ⇒ H ′⊥ 4 H⊥
• orthomodularity (OM):
H 4 H ′ :iff H = H upriseH ′
⇔ H ′ = H gH ′
⇒ H ′ = H g (H ′ upriseH⊥) (OM)
Proposition 1. The complete lattice BAO is a completion [8, Definition 7.36]
of the lattice (and thus partially ordered set) OML via the order-embedding ρ,
that is,
for all H,H ′ ∈ H(S), H 4 H ′ if and only if ρ(H) ⊆ ρ(H ′) .
Proof. Let H,H ′ ∈ H(S). Suppose that H 4 H ′. By definition of 4, H =
H uprise H ′. Further suppose that s ∈ ρ(H). Thus s ∈ ρ(H uprise H ′). Hence s ∈
ρ(H) ∩ ρ(H ′) by the meet-homomorphism property of ρ. Thus s ∈ ρ(H ′).
Conversely, suppose that ρ(H) ⊆ ρ(H ′). Thus ρ(H) = ρ(H) ∩ ρ(H ′). Hence
ρ(H) = ρ(HupriseH ′) by the meet-homomorphism property of ρ. HenceH = HupriseH ′
by the injectivity of ρ. Thus H 4 H ′.
Notice that we have not used any property of ∼ in the proof of Proposition 1.
The interesting properties of ∼ are enumerated in the next proposition, which
asserts that ∼ can mimic the orthocomplement ⊥ of OML in our BAO via ρ.
The essential ones are the first and the second (see the proofs of the others).
Proposition 2 (Properties of ∼).
1. ∼∼ρ(H) = ρ(H) (involutive interaction with itself)
2. ∼(S ∩ S′) = ∼S ∪ ∼S′ (De-Morgan interaction with meet and join)
(thus ∼(ρ(H) ∩ ρ(H ′)) = ∼ρ(H) ∪ ∼ρ(H ′))
3. ∼(ρ(H) ∪ ρ(H ′)) = ∼ρ(H) ∩ ∼ρ(H ′)
4. ρ(H) ∩ ∼ρ(H) = ρ(0)
5. ρ(H) ∪ ∼ρ(H) = ρ(1)
6. (H 4 H ′ or ρ(H) ⊆ ρ(H ′)) implies
(a) ∼ρ(H ′) ⊆ ∼ρ(H) and
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(b) ρ(H ′) = ρ(H) ∪ (ρ(H ′) ∩ ∼ρ(H))
7. ∼ρ(0) = ρ(1)
8. ∼ρ(1) = ρ(0)
Proof. For (1), let H ∈ H(S) and recall that H⊥⊥ = H. Thus ρ(H⊥⊥) = ρ(H).
Hence ∼∼ρ(H) = ρ(H). For (2), let S, S′ ∈ P(S) and consider:
∼(S ∩ S′) = ∼
(
S ∪ S′
)
([Boolean] De Morgan)
= (〈R〉 ◦ · ◦ · ) (S ∪ S′ ) (definition)
= 〈R〉 (S ∪ S′ ) ([Boolean] involution)
= 〈R〉 (S ) ∪ 〈R〉 (S′ ) (Fact 2)
= (〈R〉 ◦ · )(S) ∪ (〈R〉 ◦ · )(S′) (definition)
= ∼S ∪ ∼S′ (definition)
For (3), let H,H ′ ∈ H(S) and consider:
∼(ρ(H) ∪ ρ(H ′)) = ∼(∼(∼ρ(H)) ∪ ∼(∼ρ(H ′))) (1)
= ∼∼(∼ρ(H) ∩ ∼ρ(H ′)) (2)
= ∼ρ(H) ∩ ∼ρ(H ′) (1)
For (4) and (5), let H ∈ H(S). For (4), recall that H uprise H⊥ = 0. Thus
ρ(HupriseH⊥) = ρ(0). Hence, ρ(H)∩ρ(H⊥) = ρ(0) and then ρ(H)∩∼ρ(H) = ρ(0).
For (5), recall that H gH⊥ = 1. Hence:
ρ(1) = ρ(H gH⊥)
= ρ
((
H⊥ upriseH⊥⊥
)⊥)
(definition)
= ρ
(
(H⊥ upriseH)⊥
)
(involution)
= ∼ρ(H⊥ upriseH) (∼-homomorphism)
= ∼(ρ(H⊥) ∩ ρ(H)) (meet-homomorphism)
= ∼ρ(H⊥) ∪ ∼ρ(H) (2)
= ∼∼ρ(H) ∪ ∼ρ(H) (∼-homomorphism)
= ρ(H) ∪ ∼ρ(H) (1)
For (6.a) and (6.b), let H,H ′ ∈ H(S) and suppose that H 4 H ′ or ρ(H) ⊆
ρ(H ′). For (6.a), first suppose that H 4 H ′. Thus H ′⊥ 4 H⊥ by antitonicity.
Hence ρ(H ′⊥) ⊆ ρ(H⊥) by Proposition 1. Hence ∼ρ(H ′) ⊆ ∼ρ(H) by ∼-
homomorphism. Now suppose for (6.a) that ρ(H) ⊆ ρ(H ′). Hence H 4 H ′ by
Proposition 1, and proceed like in the first case. For (6.b), first suppose that
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H 4 H ′. Thus H ′ = H g (H ′ upriseH⊥) by orthomodularity. Hence:
ρ(H ′) = ρ(H g (H ′ upriseH⊥))
= ρ
((
H⊥ uprise
(
H ′ upriseH⊥
)⊥)⊥)
(definition)
= ∼ρ
(
H⊥ uprise
(
H ′ upriseH⊥
)⊥)
(∼-homomorphism)
= ∼
(
ρ(H⊥) ∩ ρ
((
H ′ upriseH⊥
)⊥))
(meet homomorphism)
= ∼ρ(H⊥) ∪ ∼ρ
((
H ′ upriseH⊥
)⊥)
(2)
= ∼∼ρ(H) ∪ ∼∼ρ(H ′ upriseH⊥) (∼-homomorphism)
= ρ(H) ∪ ρ(H ′ upriseH⊥) (1)
= ρ(H) ∪ (ρ(H ′) ∩ ρ(H⊥)) (meet-homomorphism)
= ρ(H) ∪ (ρ(H ′) ∩ ∼ρ(H)) (∼-homomorphism)
Now suppose for (6.b) that ρ(H) ⊆ ρ(H ′). Hence H 4 H ′ by Proposition 1,
and proceed like in the first case. For (7), consider (4). Hence:
∼ρ(0) = ∼(ρ(H) ∩ ∼ρ(H))
= ∼ρ(H) ∪ ∼∼ρ(H) (2)
= ∼ρ(H) ∪ ρ(H) (1)
= ρ(1) (5)
For (8), consider (7). Thus ∼∼ρ(0) = ∼ρ(1). Hence ρ(0) = ∼ρ(1) by (1).
In spite of Proposition 2 having only the status of a proposition, its proof actu-
ally contains more information than the proof of the following (main) theorem.
Theorem 1 (Representation Theorem for Orthomodular Lattices). The struc-
ture S := 〈 { ρ(H) | H ∈ H(S) }, ρ(0),∩,∪, ρ(1),∼,⊆〉 is a sublattice of sets of
the powerset lattice BAO that is isomorphic to OML via the lattice-embedding
ρ, that is, ρ is a bijection between OML and S, and preserves the structure:
ρ(0) = ρ(0)
ρ(H upriseH ′) = ρ(H) ∩ ρ(H ′)
ρ(H gH ′) = ρ(H) ∪ ρ(H ′)
ρ(1) = ρ(1)
ρ(H⊥) = ∼ρ(H)
Proof. By definition, ρ is an injection from OML into BAO and thus also into
S, and preserves the orthocomplement ⊥ and the orthomodular meet uprise. By
definition of S, ρ is also a surjection from OML onto S, and preserves also the
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orthomodular bounds 0 and 1. For the preservation of the orthomodular join g
consider that:
ρ(H gH ′) = ρ
((
H⊥ upriseH ′⊥
)⊥)
(definition)
= ∼ρ(H⊥ upriseH ′⊥) (∼-homomorphism)
= ∼(ρ(H⊥) ∩ ρ(H ′⊥)) (meet homomorphism)
= ∼ρ(H⊥) ∪ ∼ρ(H ′⊥) (Proposition 2.2)
= ∼∼ρ(H) ∪ ∼∼ρ(H ′) (∼-homomorphism)
= ρ(H) ∪ ρ(H ′) (Proposition 2.1)
Let us take stock, and record which properties of the accessibility relation R
were actually required to prove our theorem. Observe that only Proposition 2.1
and 2.2 require such properties. The proof of Proposition 2.2 requires Fact 2 and
only that one as such a property. Less obviously, because somehow hidden in
plain sight, Proposition 2.1 itself is actually another such property. It stipulates
that for all S ∈ { ρ(H) | H ∈ H(S) },
S = (〈R〉 ◦ · ◦ 〈R〉 ◦ · )(S)
= (〈R〉 ◦ [R] ◦ · ◦ · )(S)
= (〈R〉 ◦ [R])(S) .
It is well known that the inclusion (〈R〉 ◦ [R])(S) ⊆ S stipulates the sym-
metry of R, corresponding to the so-called B-axiom A → ♦A (see for ex-
ample [11]). However to our knowledge, the inclusion S ⊆ (〈R〉 ◦ [R])(S)
has no name yet; we shall call it the Q-property of R, its corresponding
axiom ♦A → A the Q-axiom, and the resulting normal modal logic the
logic BQ (= K+B+Q). Observe that both the B-axiom as well as the Q-
axiom are Sahlqvist-formulas [17], and so correspond to (satisfiable) first-order-
logically (FOL-)definable classes of Kripke-frames. Of course, symmetry is FOL-
definable: ∀s∀s′(s R s′ → s′ R s). And so is the class of Kripke-frames corre-
sponding to the Q-axiom [12]: ∀s∃s′(s R s′ ∧∀s′′((s′ R s′′)→ (s′′ = s))), which
implies the seriality ∀s∃s′(s R s′) of R (see also Appendix A), which in turn cor-
responds to the D-axiom A→ ♦A (or equivalently, ¬⊥). That is, falsehood
can never be observed to be true (consistency of observability). Note that the
satisfiability of these FOL-translations implies the existence of our accessibility
relation R, which is characterised in terms of these translations.
In the light of [14], the FOL-definability of our accessibility relation R may
seem contradictory. However, consider that [14] applies to Kripke-semantics
of QL and not to Kripke-semantics of some modal logic (such as BQ) into
which QL embeds. The properties of the two accessibility relations need not
coincide. For a well-known counter-example consider Intuitionistic Logic (IL),
whose Kripke-semantics has an accessibility relation that is a partial order [15],
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and the normal modal logic S4, into which IL embeds via the Go¨del-McKinsey-
Tarski translation, and whose accessibility relation is only a pre-order.
In the following corollary, we apply ρ tacitly on QL-formulas A rather than
on their semantic counterparts H (their Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra quotient).
Corollary 1. Syntactically, ρ is a linear-time reduction from QL to BQ:
A ∈ QL if and only if ρ(A) ∈ BQ.
Proof. Assuming that any quantum disjunction in a given QL-formula A has
been expanded by its definition in terms of quantum negation and quantum
conjunction, we just substitute any occurrence of the quantum-negation symbol
∼ in A with ¬ or with ♦¬ (as already said in the introduction), in order to
obtain the corresponding BQ-formula. When performed on A represented as
a (linear) string of symbols, this substitution procedure obviously takes linear
time (no back-tracking required).
In the sequel, let us write the customary “`BQ A” for “A ∈ BQ,” meaning
that A is a theorem of BQ. The following proposition concludes that  and ♦
are globally equivalent.
Proposition 3.
1. The converse of necessitation
from A infer A (CN),
is a derived deduction rule for BQ.
2. `BQ A iff `BQ A
3. `BQ A iff `BQ ♦A
4. `BQ A iff `BQ ♦A
Proof. For (1), suppose that `BQ A. Hence `BQ ♦A, by modus ponens, be-
cause `BQ A → ♦A. Hence `BQ ♦A, by necessitation. Hence `BQ A, by
modus ponens, because `BQ ♦A → A (Q-axiom). That is, `BQ A implies
`BQ A. From this and necessitation then follows (2). For (3) and (4), consider:
`BQ ♦A iff `BQ ♦A (2)
iff `BQ A BQ-axiom, modus ponens, bidirectional
iff `BQ A (2)
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3 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that Quantum Logic (QL) is a fragment of the classical
normal modal logic BQ, which in turn is a fragment of classical (in every sense
of the word) first-order logic (via the Standard Translation [3]). In other words,
we have refuted Birkhoff and von Neumann’s classic thesis that the logic (the
formal character) of Quantum Mechanics would be non-classical [2] as well as
Putnam’s thesis that quantum logic (of his kind) would be the correct logic
for propositional inference in general [16]. The propositional logic of Quantum
Mechanics has turned out to be modal but classical, and the correct logic for
propositional inference need not have an extroverted quantum character. The
philosophical key to our result has been to internalise observability into our (log-
ical) system (by means of a normal necessity modality), which in some sense
is what Quantum Mechanics has always told us to do. With that, the mys-
tery of the failure of classical conjunction to distribute over classical disjunction
has dissolved and an elementary-logical solution for this (weak)3 paradox has
emerged. (Other paradoxes of Quantum Mechanics may subsequently dissolve
too.) In a formal sense, we have reduced Quantum Logic (QL) to Classical
Logic, within a simple modal logic (BQ). Translations of QL in a similar spirit
but to more complex modal systems can be found in [9] and [1]. Then, trans-
lations of ortholattices (lattices with an orthocomplement but, as opposed to
our orthomodular lattices, without the orthomodular law) can be found in [13]
and [7]. Finally, first-order extensions (with quantifiers) as well as dynamic and
fixpoint extensions are possible (see for example [6], [1], and [5], respectively).
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A Proof that seriality is a theorem of BQ
The following lemma recalls that so-called regularity is a derived rule for any
normal modal logic and thus also for BQ.
Lemma 1 (Regularity). The rule “from A → B infer A → B,” called
regularity, is derivable in any normal modal logic.
Proof. Suppose that A→ B is a theorem of the considered normal modal logic,
say L, that is, (A → B) ∈ L. Hence, (A → B) ∈ L, by the necessitation rule
for L. Of course, ((A → B) → (A → B)) ∈ L, by the Kripke-axiom of L.
Hence, (A→ B) ∈ L, by the rule of modus ponens for L.
Now, seriality can be proved in BQ in the following five lines:
1. ♦⊥ → ⊥ instance of the Q-axiom
2. ¬♦⊥ 1, modus tollens
3. ⊥ → ♦⊥ “falsehood implies everything”
4. ⊥ → ♦⊥ 3, regularity
5. ¬⊥ 2, 4, modus tollens
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